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Municipal Corporations-Discharge of Seattle City Employees-Civil Service-
Seattle City Service Commission. State ex rel. West v. Seattle, 50 Wn.2d 94, 309 P.2d
751 (1957). P, a Seattle civil service employee in the lighting department, was dis-
charged by the department personnel supervisor. The Seattle civil service commission
sustained her dismissal, and she appealed its decision. Seattle's city charter provides:
Art. VII, § 8: "He [superintendent of lighting] shall appoint... all officers and
employes in his department." Art. XVI, § 12: "Any officer or employee [in such civil
service] may be removed by the appointing power only upon the filing with the com-
mission of a statement in writing of the reasons therefor." Art. XVI, § 4: "The [civil
service] commission shall make rules... for... removals... ." Seattle civil service
commission Rule 1 defines "appointing officer" as "the head of a department... or a
person designated by such head of department with authority to appoint, discipline and
remove subordinates."
Held, (5-0) for P. Art. VII, § 8, and Art. XVI, § 12, taken together, mean only the
superintendent of lighting it; person may remove lighting department employees. Civil
service commission Rule 1 was violative of the city charter and so void. Therefore
P's discharge by the department personnel supervisor was ineffective.
This surprisingly strict construction of the Seattle charter will apply to the depart-
ments of engineering, water, buildings, transportation and probably to public health,
as well as to lighting. It is understood that those departments are now insuring that
discharges are signed by their heads, so the precise issue of this case probably will
not recur. However, the judicial approach of strictly construing city charters may be
used again.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Landlord and Tenant-Unlawful Detainer-Jurisdiction Over
the Person. The opinion of the supreme court of Washington in the
case of Sowers v. Lewis1 changes the law of Washington in the action
of unlawful detainer. The court, ignoring past Washington cases,
held that the notice which is to be given a tenant before an action
of unlawful detainer2 can be brought is a jurisdictional condition
1.49 Wn.2d 891, 307 P2d 1064 (1957).
2 RCW 59.12.030: A tenant of real property for a term less than life is guilty of
unlawful detainer either:
(3) When he continues in possession in person or by subtenant after a default in
the payment of rent, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, served (in man-
ner RCW 59.12.040 provided) in behalf of the person entitled to the rent upon
the person owing it, has remained uncomplied with for the period of three days
after service thereof. The notice may be served at any time after the rent
becomes due.
(4) When he continues in possession inperson or by subtenant after a neglect or
failure to keep or perform any other condition or covenant of the lease or agree-
ment under which the property is held, including any covenant not to assign
or sublet, than one for the payment of rent, and after notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the performance of such condition or covenant or the sur-
render of the property, served (in manner in RCW 59.12.040 provided) upon
him, and if there is a subtenant in actual possession of the premises, also upon
such subtenant, shall remain uncomplied with for ten days after service thereof.
Within ten days after the service of such notice the tenant, or any subtenant in
actual occupation of the premises, or any mortgagee of the term, or other
person interested in its continuance, may perform such condition or covenant
and thereby save the lease from such forfeiture."
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precedent; therefore, such notice must be properly given before the
court has jurisdiction over the person. Also, the decision is the first
in Washington dealing directly with joinder of causes of action under
the unlawful detainer statute and the result is a very technical view
which is of importance to the practicing attorney. The result is that
in bringing an action for unlawful detainer in which recovery is
sought for more than one act, the notice or notices given should take
the form of a pleading in order that all possible elements of recovery
are covered. Further, if two causes of action are joined and one
requires a longer period of notice than the other, the plaintiff should
wait the longer period of time before he proceeds in his action.
Marie Weeks Sowers leased to Alex Lewis certain real estate in
King County. Lewis agreed to pay rent in monthly instalments. Lewis
became delinquent in rent. According to plaintiff's complaint, Lewis
also failed to renew and pay premiums on insurance coverages, which
the plaintiff was obliged to pay in order to protect the property.
The plaintiff, Sowers, brought an unlawful detainer proceeding in
which two causes of action were pleaded. The first cause pleaded was
the failure to pay rent. Under this cause of action the plaintiff could
recover the premises and double the rental value.3 The second cause
of action pleaded was breach of covenant to pay the insurance
premiums. The plaintiff also pleaded that the defendant had been
served with a three-day notice to pay rent or, in the alternative, to
vacate and surrender the premises. The notice also demanded per-
formance of the covenant to pay insurance premiums.
The defendant appeared specially and moved that the proceedings
be quashed upon the ground, among others, that the court had no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject matter
of the action. The plaintiff moved to strike defendant's motion to
quash, upon the ground that such motion was not a proper one in an
unlawful detainer action where service of summons complied with
the statute. The trial court denied the motion to quash and allowed
the defendant three days in which to answer. Reserving the special
appearance, defendant filed a demurrer upon six of the statutory
grounds.4
There is question as to what may actually be recovered as "double the rental
value." No attempt is made to resolve the question at this time.
4RCW 4.32.050: "The defendant may demur to the complaint when it shall appear
upon the face thereof either- (1) that the court has no jurisdiction of the person of
the defendant or of the subject matter of the action. (2) that the plaintiff has no legal
capacity to sue; or- (3) that there is another action pending between the same parties
[SUMMER
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The trial court overruled the demurrer and ordered the defendant
to answer within three days. The defendant elected to stand upon his
motion to quash and his demurrer. An order of default, findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment were entered. By the judgment,
the plaintiff upon her first cause of action was restored to possession
of the premises, awarded double rental recovery, and the lease was
declared forfeited. Upon the second cause of action, plaintiff was
awarded the sum of $710.98, together with costs and disbursements.
On appeal the supreme court remanded the case with instructions to
modify the judgment by striking the portion based on the second cause
of action (breach of covenant).
The supreme court in reaching its decision reasoned as follows:
An unlawful detainer action is a special proceeding which relates
only to real estate.... Where a special statute provides a method of
process, compliance therewith is jurisdictional.
As a jurisdictional condition precedent, where a tenant is in default
in the payment of rent, the statute requires (1) that the tenant be
served with a written notice to pay rent or, in the alternative, vacate
the premises within three days from the date of service ... and (2) that
a summons and complaint be served upon the tenant which shall fix a
date certain for appearance of not less than six nor more than twelve
days from the date of service.
In the instant case, the three-day notice and the service of the sum-
mons and complaint complied with the jurisdictional requirements of
the statute, as they related to maintaining an unlawful detainer action
based upon default in the payment of rent.
The second cause of action was based upon failure to perform a
covenant of the lease other than the payment of rent. The jurisdictional
condition precedent to the maintenance of an unlawful detainer action
for breach of a covenant is a ten-day written notice. The three-day
notice which was given in the instant case was not substantial compli-
ance with the statute relating to the second cause of action. The motion
to quash the process as to the second cause of action should have been
granted.5
The reversal by the supreme court was correct. However, reversal
on jurisdictional grounds is questionable. By making the statutory
for the same cause; or- (4) that there is a defect of parties, plaintiff or defendant;
or- (5) that several causes of action have been improperly united. (6) That the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (7) That the
action has not been commenced within the time limited by law.
The particular six grounds on which defendant demurred are not set forth in the
opinion. However, it is reasonable to assume they included grounds five and six listed
above. The opinion states that the jurisdictional ground was included.
549 Wn.2d 891, 894, 307 P.2d 1064, 1067 (1957).
1958]
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notice jurisdictional the court repudiated its former position as to
jurisdiction in an unlawful detainer proceeding. The court rather
should have reversed by sustaining appellant's demurrer to the second
cause of action.
In moving to quash the defendant is usually challenging the service
of summons. In the Sowers case the court admits that there was
proper service of summons. Proper service of summons is enough to
give the court jurisdiction over the person. Having jurisdiction over
the person and the subject matter, the court was able to hear and
determine the question of unlawful detainer. However, the supreme
court went further and held that in an action for unlawful detainer,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant requires more than
service of summons and includes the giving of proper notice as required
by statute.
To say that giving of notice as required by the statute is necessary
to the court's jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is to re-
pudiate holdings of the past. In State Ex Rel Robertson v. Superior
Court,' the supreme court held,
Notice to quit or pay rent, served in the manner required by law is
a fact to be established upon the trial, before the court may pronounce a
judgment of unlawful detainer.... When the summons is properly
served the court undoubtedly has jurisdiction of the person.7
On the basis of past decisions, then, the court should not have
held that proper notice to quit or fulfill the covenant was jurisdictional,
and should not have sustained the motion to quash.
The correct approach would seem to be that plaintiff, by giving
the proper notice and service of summons as the first cause of action,
had established in the trial court jurisdiction over the person and the
subject matter to decide the question of unlawful detainer. Further-
more, the defendant, by his refusal to heed the three-day notice to quit
or pay rent, had placed himself in the status of unlawful detainer.
Therefore, the plaintiff should be entitled to possession plus the double
rental. After unlawful detention had been established the plaintiff
should not have been required, in addition, to show that he also
6 95 Wash. 447, 164 Pac. 93 (1917) ; see also Little v. Catania, 48 Wn.2d 890, 297
P.2d 255 (1956), Davis v. Palmer, 39 Wn.2d 219, 235 P.2d 151 (1951).
An excellent coverage of landlord-tenant notices prior to the Sowers case is made
by Peck, Landlord and Tenant Notices, 31 WASH. L. REv. 51 (1956).
7 95 Wash. 447, 449, 164 Pac. 93, 94 (1917).
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served the ten-day notice to perform the covenant in order to have
recovery under the unlawful detainer statute.
Assuming the above approach to be correct, there would have been
two questions remaining as to the breach of covenant. The first ques-
tion would have been whether or not the facts as pleaded in the second
cause of action (breach of covenant) actually constituted a cause of
action for recovery of possession under the unlawful detainer statute.
Since there was no ten-day notice given as required by the statute,
the breach of covenant did not furnish a basis for recovery under
the statute. The lack of the ten-day notice was evident from the face
of the complaint, and the trial court should have sustained the de-
murrer as to the second cause of action on the ground that the com-
plaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.'
A holding on this ground would have been in complete accord with
past decisions.
The second question would have been whether or not several causes
of action had been improperly united.' Plaintiff in his second cause of
action prayed for judgment against defendant in the sum of $710.98.
This was the amount plaintiff had to pay to renew and pay premiums
on insurance coverage. The prayer was one for general damages and
not one for relief under the unlawful detainer statute." This factor,
combined with the failure to give ten-day notice, would have made
the plaintiff's second cause of action only a general proceeding for
breach of covenant.
A general proceeding cannot be joined with a special proceeding
for the reasons given in Little v. Catania." In that case the court held
8 See note 3 mipra (ground 6).
9 See note 3 supra (ground 5).10 RCW 59.12.170. This statute states what may be included in a judgment of
unlawful detainer. It provides in part: "If the proceedings are for unlawful detainer
after neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant or a lease under which
the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment shall also
declare the forfeiture of the lease or tenancy. The jury or the court shall also assess
the damages occasioned to the plaintiff by a forcible entry or a forcible or unlawful
detainer."
The damages plaintiff prays for on breach of covenant are not damages occasioned
by the unlawful detainer." It is the view of the writer that the statute precludes the
recovery of such damages as plaintiff prayed for in an unlawful detainer action, there-
fore such damages must be recovered in a general proceeding. Such a view has not
been taken previously by the courts and would be confronted with the case of Munro v.
Irwin, 163 Wash. 452, 1 P2d 329 (1931), in which it was held that an unlawful detainer
proceeding in which damages could have been recovered was res judicata in a later
proceeding for recovery of such damages. The question of damages recoverable under
unlawful detainer proceedings is one which it is anticipated will be covered thoroughly
at a later date in the WASHNGTON LAw-V REVEw.
1148 Wn.2d 890, 297 P.2d 255 (1956).
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that where a special summons is used to get jurisdiction over the person
in a special proceeding (unlawful detainer), it is "wholly insufficient to
give the court jurisdiction of the parties in a general proceeding..
and further:
The court obtained jurisdiction of the parties for a limited statutory
purpose only--namely, to determine the issue of possession in an
unlawful detainer action. Having obtained that limited jurisdiction,
the court could not transform the special statutory proceedings into an
ordinary lawsuit, and determine the issues and grant relief therein as
though the action was a general proceeding.12
It is evident the court could have used the Little decision to sustain
a demurrer on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action.
From the previous discussion it can be seen that the court should
not have ventured into the area of jurisdiction. Having so ventured.
however, it has made jurisdiction under the unlawful detainer statute
a very technical matter. The Sowers case, if it means anything, means
that hereafter in an unlawful detainer action the plaintiff will be
required to give service of notice and proper service of summons as
required by the statute before the court will have jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant. If there is a defect in giving the notice
and the court does not have proper jurisdiction, the question of juris-
diction may be raised for the first time on appeal. 13
With the technical approach of the Sowers case now a matter of
Washington law, attorneys will be required to give greater attention
to notices required by the unlawful detainer statute. First, it seems
necessary that where recovery is sought on more than one ground
in an unlawful detainer action the notice given should take the form
of a pleading to assure that all elements have been covered. A second
item is that of time of the commencement of the action. If two causes
of action have been joined, and, as in the Sowers case, one cause re-
quires a three-day notice and the other a ten-day notice, there can
be no commencement of the action until the ten-day period has
expired. If the action is brought sooner the holding of the Sowers
case will apply and no recovery will be allowed in the cause of action
requiring the ten-day notice. The practical effect is that joining a
ten-day cause of action with a three-day cause of action converts the
12 48 Wn.2d 890,893, 297 P.2d 255, 257 (1956). This case is used only for the
proposition that a special service of summons cannot be used to gain jurisdiction over
the person where a general proceeding matter is involved.
Is Rules on Appeal, 43, 34A Wn2d 47, as amended, effective January 2, 1953.
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three-day cause into a ten-day cause. In order to recover on both
it is advisable to wait until the longer period has elapsed.
Dismissal and Nonsuit-Voluntary Nonsuit-Nature of Right.
Rule 4 of Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure1 has gained addi-
tional interpretation in the case of McReynolds v. Thaler.2 In the
McReynolds case the defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of
the evidence of the plaintiff after the plaintiff had concluded his open-
ing case. The plaintiff then moved for a voluntary nonsult. The trial
court held that the plaintiff had an absolute right to a voluntary non-
suit up to the time of a final ruling against him and that granting of
the motion involved no element of discretion. This was the law in
Washington, both statutory3 and at common law,4 until the adoption
of rule 4.
On appeal the supreme court reversed, pointing out that under rule
4 a plaintiff has an absolute right to a voluntary nonsuit only up to
the time he rests his opening case, unless the defendant has interposed
a set-off as a defense or seeks affirmative relief growing out of the
same transaction, and that after the plaintiff concludes his opening
case nonsuit is discretionary with the trial judge on a showing of good
cause.
In In Re Archers Estate' the court held that under rule 4 a plaintiff
is entitled to a voluntary nonsuit at any time before he rests at the
conclusion of his opening case, unless the defendant has interposed
a set-off as a defense or seeks affirmative relief growing out of the
same transaction. The Archer case also held that a plaintiff's right is
absolute and involves no element of discretion on the part of the
trial court. The Archer ruling was followed in McKay v. McKay.6
The court in the McKay case, however, went further than the Archer
case to hold that the right of voluntary nonsult is fixed at the moment
I 34A Wn.2d 70. Rule 4 is as follows: "An action of the Superior Court, tried either
with or without a jury, may be dismissed by the court and a judgment of nonsuit
rendered upon the motion of the plaintiff at any time before plaintiff rests at the con-
clusion of his opening case, unless the defendant has interposed a set-off as a defense,
or seeks affirmative relief growing out of the same transaction or claim, either legal
or equitable, to the specific property or thing which is the subject matter of the action:
PROVIDED, That the trial judge may thereafter entertain a motion for a voluntarydismissal without prejudice by the plaintiff upon good and sufficient cause in support
thereof, being first shown, but in such event the granting or refusal of such motion,
and the imposition of terms as a condition precedent to the granting of such motion
shall rest in the sound discretion of the trial court."
2 49 ,Vn2d 905, 307 P.2d 1060 (1957).
3 RCW 4.56.120.
4 Kosinski v. Hines, 110 Wash. 25, 187 Pac. 712 (1920).
536 Wn2d 505, 219 P.2d 112 (1950).647 Wn.2d 301, 287 P.2d 330 (1955).
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it is claimed, and thereafter the defendant is not entitled to claim a
set-off or seek affirmative relief in order to prevent the granting of a
nonsuit.
The Archer and McKay cases were concerned only with the right
of the plaintiff to a nonsuit before he rests at the conclusion of his
opening case. This was the factual difference the court in the McRey-
nolds case used to limit the McKay case. The court held that once
the plaintiff has rested, the absolute right to nonsuit provided for in
rule 4 is at an end and, thereafter, the proviso to rule 4 is in effect.
That is to say, the trial court may entertain a motion for a voluntary
"dismissal without prejudice," "upon good and sufficient cause in sup-
port thereof being first shown." This means that nonsuit may be
granted at the discretion of the trial judge after the plaintiff has rested
his case in chief, but only on a showing of good cause. In the McRey-
nolds case the trial judge was mistaken as to the plaintiff's right under
rule 4. No good cause was shown for the exercise of discretion by
the judge in granting a nonsuit and no discretion was exercised; there-
fore the judgment of the trial court was reversed.
JAMES C. YOUNG
Trial-Dismissal and Nonsuit-Taking Case from Jury-Insufficiency of Opening
Statement. In Bartel v. Brockernina, 49 Wn.2d 679, 306 P.2d 237 (1957), plaintiff
brought an action for damages for personal injuries sustained as a passenger in defend-
ant's car. Defendant's answer alleged contributory negligence and also that plaintiff
was an invited guest or licensee without payment for such transportation, which under
the host-guest statute barred his action.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's opening statement defendant moved for a dismissal
on the theory that the opening statement affirmatively showed that plaintiff had no
cause of action. This was evidently based on the fact that the host-guest statute would
prevail. When the trial judge indicated he would grant the motion, plaintiff requested
permission to amend the opening statement to show facts which terminated the host-
guest relationship. The trial judge refused to permit plaintiff to amend the opening
statement, granted defendant's motion for dismissal, and entered judgment accordingly.
On appeal the supreme court reversed. The court stated that a trial court may direct
judgment of dismissal on the opening statement of counsel for plaintiff. The purpose
of the rule is to reasonably expedite litigation when it is clear that plaintiff had no
cause of action. In the instant case, however, the time necessary for counsel to amend
his opening statement would have consumed no more than five minutes. Under these
circumstances the amendment could have been granted without harming the underlying
purpose of the procedure.
Pleading, Practice and Procedure-Pre-Trial Depositions-Effect of Pre-Trial
Depositions as Substantive Evidence. In Hurst v. Washington Canners Co-op., 50
W.2d 729, 314 P.2d 651 (1957), an employee brought an action against her employer
to recover for personal injuries sustained when she slipped on a stairway in the
[SUMMER
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employer's cannery. The defendant cannery had taken a pre-trial deposition of the
plaintiff in which she had stated that prior to the time of her injury she was aware of
the slippery condition of the stairs. However, at trial, she rebutted the testimony given
in the deposition and denied any previous knowledge of the dangerous condition of the
stairs. The defendant then, during cross-examination, used the deposition of the plain-
tiff to impeach her testimony given upon direct examination. At the close of the
plaintiff's evidence, the defendant moved for a non-suit, arguing that the plaintiff's
admission in the deposition of prior knowledge of the dangerous condition of the stairs
was binding upon her as a matter of law; that the plaintiff had "'sworn herself out of
court." The trial court granted the motion for non-suit, but later, upon further consid-
eration, granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial. From the order granting a new
trial the defendant appealed.
The supreme court affirmed the order granting a new trial. After setting out Rule
26(f), Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, 34A W.2d 86, the court held that
where a party uses the deposition of an adverse party for purposes of impeachment
only, the evidence contained therein affects only the credibility of the party as a wit-
ness, and that it was within the province of the jury to consider and weigh the plain-
tiff's testimony to determine therefrom whether or not her conduct constituted con-
tributory negligence.
REAL PROPERTY
Limited-Access Highway Condemnation-Compensation for
Loss of Easement of Access-Measure of Compensation. State v.
Calkins,' which involved damages to be paid for condemned land used
in the construction of a new limited-access highway, held that no com-
pensation need be paid for the alleged taking of easement of access,2
and that expert testimony relative to the value of commercial highway
frontage property is not admissible. The court also defined the method
of computation of the compensation which must be paid where the land
taken separates the remaining property of the condemnee.3
The state condemned property for use as a new limited-access high-
way connecting Ephrata with highway 11-G, which runs between Soap
1 50 Wn.2d 716, 314 P.2d 449 (1957).
2 State v. Ward, 41 Wn2d 794, 252 P.2d 279 (1953), has dictum which is incon-
sistent with the holding of the instant case, but the court states that this dictum is not
binding authority.
The court uses the terms "easement of access," "easement of ingress and egress,"
and "easements of access, air, light, and view" indiscriminately in the opinion, depend-
ing upon the authority cited. While the terms are not equally inclusive, for the pur-
pose of new limited-access highway condemnation they should be treated the same.
In a problem concerning an existing highway it may be necessary to distinguish the
terms.
3 By way of dictum the court points out that two cases involving limited-access
highways have been nullified by legislation. State ex rel. Veys v. Superior Ct 33
Wn.2d 638, 206 P.2d 1028 (1949), which held that the state does not have the power
to condemn access rights when an existing highway is converted into a limited-access
one, has been nullified by RCW 47.52.050, which gives the power to condemn access
rights. State ex rel. Troy v. Superior Ct. 37 Wn.2d 660, 225 P.2d 890 (1950), which
held that "existing highways" includes relocated portions of the old highway, has been
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